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Insurance-Waiver of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Because of the phenomenal increase of automobile accidents in the
United States over the past thirty years, most drivers have purchased
automobile liability insurance. Thus the average driver's concern for his
own economic well-being has ensured that in a majority of accidents,
the injured party has a reliable source, an insurance company, to com-
pensate him for at least part of his damage. However, a significant
number of persons are injured by negligent drivers who have neither
liability insurance nor private funds to provide compensation. State
legislatures have moved to ease the difficulties of these injured persons,
and statutes in forty-six states2 require that some type of uninsured
motorist coverage 3 be offered in all automobile liability insurance poli-
cies. In thirty-five states,4 however, the statute allows the insured to
reject such coverage.
The Pennsylvania statute5 considered in Johnson v. Concord Mu-
'See A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, 3-17 (1969) for a history of
uninsured motorist protection laws in general.
Maryland, New Jersey and North Dakota have unsatisfied judgment funds from which those
injured by uninsured motorists may be compensated. Wyoming has no provision for victims of
uninsured motorists. See 3 Cum.-San. L. Rev. 200, 202 n.9 (1972).
'This coverage provides for the policy holder and other insureds in the event of an accident
caused by an uninsured and financially irresponsible driver. Under most endorsements, the injured
insured is able to collect, from his own insurance company, compensation for injury up to the
amount that would have been paid had the uninsured driver carried the minimum insurance
required by the state financial responsibility laws.
Most endorsements are somewhat limited however in that, in general, insurers will not offer
uninsured motorist coverage in amounts over the state minimum requirement for liability insur-
ance. Further, uninsured motorist coverage deals, for the most part, only with recovey for personal
injury. If a motorist wishes to have coverage for property damage, he must obtain it through
purchase of collision insurance. See A. WIDISS, supra note I, at 136-37.
'Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, South
Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia have statutes requiring mandatory inclusion of
uninsured motorist coverage in insurance policies issued within the state. See A. WIDISS, supra note
I, at 310.
'At the time of the Johnson decision the statute provided:
No policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for
bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State, unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death as are fixed
from time to time by the General Assembly . . . under provision approved by the
Insurance Commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehi-
cles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom:
Provided, however, that the named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage
in writing . . ..
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tual Insurance Co.' allowed such a waiver. However, in defining valid
waiver, the legislature went no further than to specify that the rejection
be in writing. In Johnson, the plaintiff had purchased a liability policy
and had signed a statement at the bottom of the binder-application that
claimed, "I HEREBY STATE THAT I DO NOT DESIRE UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IN MY AUTO LIABILITY
POLICY." After being involved in an accident with an uninsured mo-
torist, plaintiff Johnson brought a suit in equity against his insurance
company seeking reformation of his policy. Johnson alleged that his
signature under the above statement did not constitute a valid rejection
of uninsured motorist coverage and that therefore the coverage was
improperly excluded from his policy.
In deciding this case, the Pennsylvania court was faced for the first
time with interpreting the validity of a signed written waiver placed in
the policy to comply with statutory requirements. Relying heavily on
California cases dealing with a statute which was at that time similar
to Pennsylvania's, the court ruled that the statute gave insureds a legal
right to uninsured motorist coverage which could be waived only with
"knowledge of such a right and an evident purpose to surrender it."'
Since the court found that the statement plaintiff had signed was insuffi-
cient on its face to constitute a valid and knowledgeable waiver, the
burden was on the insurer to prove that the insured had "intelligently
and knowingly" waived coverage Since the testimony taken at the trial
did not reveal that uninsured motorist coverage had been discussed in
detail by plaintiff and the insurance agent, the court held that the insurer
had not met its burden of proof and "[i]n these circumstances, the
insured's signature, is insufficient to establish an effective rejection of
his statutory right of protection."'"
In finding the waiver ineffective, the court disregarded the tradi-
tional rules of waiver applied in contract cases in which the intent of
the parties is not examined if the meaning of the binding words is
obvious." Instead, the court applied the more stringent rules of waiver
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1971).
'450 Pa. 614, 300 A.2d 61 (1973).
7CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1963), as amended. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1973).
1450 Pa. at - 300 A.2d at 65.
'450 Pa. at , 300 A.2d at 65, citing Litchenberger v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 7 NC.
App. 269, 172 S.E.2d 284 (1970).
"1450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 65.
"t5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 681 (3d. 1961).
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of personal liberty rights announced in recent criminal cases that stress
the individual's knowledge of his rights and his voluntary decision to
forego them.12
The basis of this decision can be found partly in past judicial inter-
pretation of legislative intent in passing uninsured motorist statutes. For
example, in Bankes v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.'3 the
insured while riding on a newly acquired motorcycle, had been killed by
an uninsured motorist. His insurance company refused to compensate
the family on the grounds that the policy in effect at the time of the
accident specifically did not cover newly acquired uninsured "land
motor vehicles." The company further argued that this exclusion was
authorized by the Insurance Commissioner since he had approved policy
forms which provided that uninsured motorist coverage would not apply
to injury suffered by a policyholder while occupying an uninsured "auto-
mobile" owned by him. In invalidating the "land motor vehicle limita-
tion," the court spoke of the legislative intent in passing the statute-to
provide protection for innocent victims of highway accidents. 4 In order
to carry out this intent the statutory provisions must be given liberal
construction, and any limits of the policy repugnant to the protective
purpose of the act must be disregarded." In this case, the approved
"automobile" exclusion could not be broadened to a "land motor vehi-
cle" exclusion since it was the intent of the legislature to provide cover-
age, rather than to restrict it.6
The need for liberal construction of the statute and narrow reading
of policy exceptions to uphold legislative intent was also the basis for
decision in an earlier Pennsylvania case. In Harleysville Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Blumling,7 the insured while at work was involved in an
accident with an uninsured motorist. He was originally compensated
'"See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
As will be discussed later, the test of knowledgeable and intelligent waiver of uninsured motorist
coverage had been applied previously in other state courts. See text accompanying notes 19-25
intfra.
1216 Pa. Super. 162, 264 A.2d 197 (1970).
""The intent of this act is that the insured recover those damages which he would have
received had the uninsured motorist maintained a liability policy." Id. at 168, 264 A.2d at 200.
11d. at 165, 264 A.2d at 198.
"In regard to the "automobile" exclusion which had been approved by the Insurance Commis-
sioner and relied on by State Farm, the court noted, although it did not decide, that this exclusion
was probably never contemplated by the legislature. As a basis for this, the court mentioned that
the legislature had considered this specific limitation in a 1968 amendment to the uninsured
motorist act, but had excluded it from the final amendment. Id. at 167, 264 A.2d at 199.
'7429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
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through his employer's uninsured motorist coverage, and his own com-
pany denied coverage on the basis of a limiting clause in his policy that
provided for deduction of previously paid compensation. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court ruled this limitation invalid through a liberal
construction of the statute. Although the statute provided that the in-
sured would have at least 10,000 dollars coverage under his policy, this
could not be construed to limit his total recovery to only 10,000 dollars
if another's policy had provided him with compensation.18
The Johnson case can be distinguished from the previous cases in
several respects. In both Bankes and Blumling, the insured had pur-
chased and paid for coverage, and in each case the insured was clearly
covered for some uninsured motorist loss. Bankes and Blumling estab-
lished that Pennsylvania courts, using liberal construction of the statute
to satisfy legislative intent, would not look favorably on company re-
strictions placed on uninsured motorist endorsements. However, in
Johnson the court was presented with a slightly different problem, per-
haps more difficult to resolve even by using the precedent of liberal
construction. Johnson had not paid for any uninsured motorist coverage
and had signed a waiver form that had been specifically provided for
by statute.
To hold for the insured in this case, the court would not have to
liberally construe a broad statute giving general coverage, but would
have to define or limit a seemingly explicit portion of the statute that
allowed waiver. However, the same public policy that mandated liberal
statutory construction to accomplish legislative intent has been found
to also require narrow and strict construction of that portion of the
statute allowing rejection of coverage. 9
Other jurisdictions have previously decided cases concerning waiver
of uninsured motorist protection and have concluded that waiver of
coverage is effective only if the waiver manifests the intentional relin-
quishment of the right to protection. In Hagar v. Elite Insurance Co.2"
an injured policyholder had also signed a simple waiver of uninsured
motorist coverage.2' As in Johnson, the insured claimed that neither his
111d. at 395, 241 A.2d at 115.
"450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 64.
-'22 Cal. App. 3d 505, 99 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971).
-1The waiver signed here read:
The applicant hereby agrees with the company that the coverage of Uninsured Motor-
ists, is excluded from the policy and that the policy shall afford no coverage for damage
caused by uninsured motor vehicles under the provision of the applicable section of the
insurance code of the state in which this insurance is written.
[Vol. 52
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statutory right to the coverage nor the terms of the coverage had been
explained to him. The California court, in holding this waiver inade-
quate, distinguished this case from other contract cases. "Because such
coverage is indicated by the legislature to be a matter of public policy,
a claim of deletion is not determined simply by reference to the rules
that courts otherwise apply to determine the intent of contracting par-
ties. 1 2 Since the motorist has a legal right to insurance under the stat-
ute, this right must be explicitly explained and clearly understood. Mere
mention of the availability of uninsured motorist protection is not
enough to show a clear explanation and the insured's signature under a
one line waiver is not sufficient to claim clear understanding.
3
The possible ambiguities of a similar simple waiver statement were
pointed out, again by the California court, in Bohlert v. Spartan Insur-
ance Co.2 14 in which the court explained,
[T]he language providing that "the policy shall afford no coverage for
the damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle" does not show the
prospective insured that it means damage incurred by him; he could
readily construe it to mean coverage for damage caused to others by
an "uninsured motor vehicle" for whose operation he was responsi-
ble. . ..
Considering these possible ambiguities of a single waiver and the statu-
tory right of the insured to receive coverage, the court found that
"[b]ecause the language is ambiguous to this extent, it does not-on its
face-meet the standard that an agreement excluding uninsured motor-
ist coverage must be 'conspicuous, plain and clear' to constitute an
'effective waiver' thereof."2
However, liberal construction of the statute has not always de-
feated policy limitations. In Dreher v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 21
the plaintiff was injured by a motorist whose insurance company later
became insolvent. Aetna denied liability because the plaintiff's policy
defined an "uninsured automobile" as "an automobile with respect to
the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily liability
If Uninsured Motorist Coverage NOT Desired, Sign Here
Id. at 507, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
221d. at 509, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
ld. at 510, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr.. 515 (1969).
'-Id. at 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
-1d. at 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 519-20
2183 III. App. 2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (1967).
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bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident .... ,1
The court was presented with the issue of whether this definition
precluded recovery from Aetna. The Illinois statute29 in effect at the
time of the accident made no reference to the definition of an uninsured
automobile. However, the legislature, at the time of the decision, was
considering a law that would explicitly extend uninsured motorist pro-
tection to the situation in which the negligent driver's company became
insolvent after the accident. Even so, the court ruled,
[W]e find nothing either in the statute or the case law to sustain the
contention that the public policy of this State, at the time, required
that an insurance company extend coverage beyond the terms of its
contract of insurance to include an automobile which was insured at
the time of the accident but which consequently becomes uninsured by
reason of the involvency of the carrier."
The Pennsylvania superior court took this same view in a similar
situation in Levy v. Keystone Insurance Co.31 in deciding
[a]ny ambiguity in a contract of insurance is to be construed most
strongly in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Furthermore,
it would seem that in the light of the reasons behind uninsured motorist
"'ld. at 142, 226 N.E.2d at 288.
"Act of June 4, 1963, § 1 [1963] Ill. Laws 1029 (codified, as amended ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
73 § 1065.151 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
"83 Ill. App. 2d at 143, 226 N.E.2d at 289. In North Carolina, the state supreme court was
faced with a similar situation in Rice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 267 N.C. 421, 148 S.E.2d 223
(1966) (per curiam). The version of North Carolina General Statutes § 20-279.21(3) which was in
effect at the time of the accident discussed in Rice was silent on the question of whether subsequent
insolvency of the insurer would make a previously insured vehicle "uninsured" for the purposes of
the statute. Ch. 640 [19611 N.C. Sess. Laws 831.
However, in 1965 the legislature amended the statute to include in the term "uninsured motor
vehicle," a vehicle "where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment . . . because of
insolvency." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1965). Later in 1965, in Buck v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34 (1965), the supreme court recognized the legislative
intent in passing the amendment and in dicta noted that the statutory addition would preclude
denial of uninsured motorist coverage in situations in which the negligent motorist's insurance
company became insolvent after the accident.
In deciding Rice. however, the North Carolina court, like the Illinois court in Dreher, refused
to retroactively apply the amended statutory definition. Further, the North Carolina court, unlike
the Illinois court, took no notice of the new legislative intent, even in view of Buck which implied
judicial recognition of the new policy. See Note. Insurance - Statutory Definition of an Uninsured
Motor Vehicle When the Liability Insurer is Insolvent or Denies Coverage, 45 N.C.L. REv. 551
(1966).
'209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899, (1966) rev'd sub nona. Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426
Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
470 [Vol. 52
WAIVER
coverage. . . a liberal construction should be given to any such provi-
sion in an insurance policy. Nevertheless, we find no ambiguity in these
contracts and we cannot, within the realm of judicial reason expand
the definition of an uninsured motorist to fit the facts of these
cases .... 32
In Illinois, the position the court took in Dreher was effectively
replaced by passage of a statute.13 In Pennsylvania, the decision of the
superior court was overruled by the supreme court.34 Explicitly citing
liberal construction of the statute as necessary to achieve legislative
intent, the supreme court held the term "uninsured motorist" to include
not only those motorists uninsured at the time of the accident, but also
those whose insurance companies were unable to pay compensation due
to insolvency.3 '
In a Florida waiver case involving uninsured motorist insurance,
Kohly v. Royal Indemnity Co., 31 an appellate court considered and
rejected the public policy argument. The plaintiff had been injured by
an uninsured motorist while driving a rented car. The rental company,
Hertz, had purchased liability insurance for its customers but had re-
jected uninsured motorist coverage. The specific statutory provision
read, "[T]he coverage required under this section shall not be applicable
where any insured named in the policy shall reject the cover-
age. . .. -3" The plaintiff contended that any should be read to mean
"every" or that named should be ignored. Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff argued that he, as an insured under the policy, had not been
given the opportunity to reject coverage and therefore, it should be
extended to him as a matter of right.
The court considered decisions holding that the public policy be-
hind the Florida statute required that insureds injured by uninsured
motorists be able to recover as if the negligent motorist had a liability
policy. However, it did not extend liberal construction to cover this case.
It rejected plaintiff's contention regarding the statutory construction
and relied on previous cases which had held "that the term 'named
3
'1d. at 19-20, 223 A.2d at 901 (citations omitted).
39lLL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 § 1065.151 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) (originally enacted as Act
of June 4, 1963, § 1 [1963] 111. Laws 1029).31Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
"Id. at 338, 231 A.2d at 405. This liberalizing decision was cited in Johnson as precedent for
its construction of the statute in the waiver situation. 450 Pa. at -, 300 A.2d at 64.
1190 So. 2d 819 (Fla. App. 1966).
31FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0851 (1963), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (Supp. 1972)
(emphasis added).
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insured' has a restricted meaning and does not apply to persons other
than those named in the policy." s Thus Hertz, as the insured named
in the policy, had the right to reject the insurance and bind all others.
Other Florida cases have dealt with related situations and applied
liberal construction to effect a broad coverage when specific limitations
were placed on persons receiving coverage. 9 However, the statutory
language discussed in Kohly may well be too explicit to raise a question
of liberal construction and any changes in the law will have to come
through legislation. 0
Although the trend toward more liberal construction of an ambigu-
ous waiver clause was well established even before Johnson, the mere
presence of such a clause will not give the insured recovery if the insurer
can show that the insured made a knowledgeable waiver. In Pechtel v.
Universal Underwriters," the court found the waiver clause to be con-
fusing, but that surrounding facts and the policyholder's own testimony
tended to show he knew what he was waiving.4" In light of this proof, a
passenger of the policyholder who was injured in an accident with an
1"190 So. 2d at 821.
"'See Southeast Title & Ins. Co., 224 So. 2d 718 (Fla. App. 1969) where the court held that
an endorsement that specifically excluded from liability 3 of the insured's sons who were under 25
would not exclude them from uninsured motorist coverage due to the legal right they had to such
insurance. See also First Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. App. 1968).
"In Weatherford v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 567, 49 Cal. Rptr. 22
(1966), the California Court of Appeals examined a similar contention by a plaintiff that the
statutory provisions giving "any named insured" the right to reject coverage should be construed
to mean that waiver of coverage should be allowed only of all the insureds rejected it. Here the
California appellate court quoted with approval the memorandum of the trial court which con-
cluded that "any" means one not all and that the policy of deciding thus was a legislative, rather
than a judicial matter.
"15 Cal. App. 3d 194, 93 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1971).
'
2However, according to the author's reading of the case, the court does not satisfactorily
clarify its finding that the policy holder knew what provisions he was waiving. He picked up the
policy application at a motorcycle dealer's and did not discuss it with an agent. He rejected a
provision entitled "Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorist" which the plaintiff contended
was ambiguous because it could have led the purchaser to believe that he only waived protection
for his family, but retained the other incidents of uninsured motorist coverage. The only proof to
which the court refers of the purchaser's knowledge of coverage provisions is that he discussed the
policy with Navy buddies. In concluding the court says, "Finally, if the applicant had inquired [of
an agent] as to whether he could exclude the family protection and secure uninsured motorist's
coverage for himself alone, he would have received a negative answer." Id. at 205, 93 Cal. Rptr.
at 61.
This statement, which seems to uphold an ambiguous waiver on the grounds that the policy
holder could have had the ambiguity clarified if he had asked, does not seem to be in agreement
with other California rulings which have held against the insurer if the policy itself did not make
the waiver clear. See Bohlert v. Spartan Ins. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1969).
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uninsured motorist was not allowed to recover simply because the
waiver itself was ambiguous.
Johnson is clearly a product of the liberalizing trend shown by the
courts in dealing with automobile insurance cases. However, Kohly and
Pechtel were also decided by courts which had accepted and indeed led
in the trend. This clearly indicates that there is question as to how far
the courts are willing to go to give the insured protection.
Liberal construction of the statute and "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of statutory rights were the only precedents mentioned in
Johnson. However, the ruling might also be taken as an example of
Keeton's theory of honoring the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured.'3 Briefly described, this theory allows the policyholder to collect
under policy terms that explicitly bar recovery because "insurers ought
not to be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions from coverage
that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a policyholder
having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of coverage in-
volved."44 Keeton goes on to explain that the policy holder ought to be
allowed to recover "even though the insurer's form is very explicit and
unambiguous, because insurers know that ordinary policyholders will
not in fact read their policies."4 While this principle could not be used
to deny the insurer an opportunity to include exceptions to coverage in
a policy, qualifications that would defeat the reasonable expectations
could be upheld only if the policyholder was "fully informed" of their
nature."6
While the principle of honoring reasonable expectations is too
broad to be universally applicable and has only occasionally been recog-
nized in the cases, Keeton sees it as the direction ii which insurance law
seems to be moving, and as a better explanation of the results in many
cases which are justified on other grounds.47
This theory can be aptly applied to the Johnson facts inasmuch as
Johnson's previous policy had included uninsured motorist coverage4 8
and the statute itself gave him a right to coverage unless rejected. While
the new policy did contain an exception to what he might "reasonably
expect" on the basis of past experience, there was no evidence that he
11R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW - BASIC TEXT § 6.3, at 350-61 (1971).
111d. at 351.
tDld.
"N1. at 361.
uld. at 351-57.
"450 Pa. at _ 300 A.2d at 62, n.1.
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was fully informed of the nature of such an exception."
No matter how it is viewed, however, Johnson and the cases that
it followed present serious problems for legislatures. If the courts inter-
pret the policy behind the uninsured motorist protection statutes as
strongly as Johnson would seem to indicate, yet still put limitations on
public policy considerations as in Kohly and Pechtel, broadly worded
statutes with imprecise waiver limitations can only create litigation.
Legislative response to this problem has followed several different direc-
tions. Legislatures in eleven states" have prevented the problem by
making coverage mandatory. Pennsylvania, by amending the statute
considered in Johnson, dealt with the issue by severely limiting the
situations in which waiver of coverage will be allowed."' California,
whose 1963 statute" was similar to the Pennsylvania law construed in
Johnson and whose court decisions were heavily relied on in Johnson,
amended its uninsured motorist statute, effective January 1, 1973, to
include a specific waiver form explaining the right to and the meaning
of uninsured motorist coverage. The statute explicitly states that "exe-
cution of such an agreement shall relieve the insurer of liability under
this section. 5 3
"Id. at - 300 A.2d at 65.
'See note 4 supra.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1971), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (1963) states
that rejection, in writing, is only allowed by
(I) An owner or operator of (i) any motor vehicle designed for carrying freight or
merchandise, (ii) any motor vehicle operated for the carriage of passengers for hire or
compensation, having in either instance been granted a certificate of public conveyance
or a permit by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or been issued a certificate
of public convenience and necessity or a permit by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and (2) An owner or operator of any other motor vehicle designed for carrying freight
or merchandise or operated for the carriage of passengers for hire whose employees are
insured under the provisions of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ....
"
2CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 1963), as amended, CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1973).
"'The required waiver states:
The California Insurance Code requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorists cover-
age in each bodily injury liability insurance policy it issues covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. Such section also permits the
insurer and the applicant to delete such coverage completely or with respect to one or
more natural persons designated by same when operating a motor vehicle. Uninsured
motorists coverage insures the insured, his heirs, or legal representatives for all sums
within the financial responsibility limits which such person or persons are legally entitled
to recover as damages for bodily injury, including any resulting sickness, disease, or
death, to him from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle not owned or
operated by the insured.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1973).
[Vol. 52
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While it is too early to ascertain" whether the California or Penn-
sylvania approaches will curtail all waiver litigation in these states, it is
not inconceivable that insureds will still have the opportunity to litigate
their claims. Especially in the case of the California statute, the issue
might be raised that because of some special circumstance-inability to
understand English or cursory treatment by an insurance agent-the
specified waiver could not be applied in an individual instance. This
problem could become increasingly pressing, especially if, as Keeton
indicates, the theory of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured becomes the trend in insurance case law.55
While this note has dealt only with the problem of waiver of unin-
sured motorist coverage protection, the waiver issue is not confined to
this narrow area. Problems can be readily anticipated in new areas,
especially under No Fault statutes, such as the one in effect in Massa-
chusetts" in which the policyholder is given the right to property protec-
tion under his policy, but has the opportunity to waive his coverage if
he was at fault in an accident, or to forego coverage entirely.57 Although
no cases have yet been reported in this area, it is not hard to imagine a
situation in which a policyholder might claim an ineffective waiver of
his right to coverage, either because he did not understand what he was
waiving in choosing less than complete coverage or because he reasona-
bly expected full coverage because of the term "No Fault" and the
publicity that has surrounded discussion of this concept."
Examined from this broader perspective, the need to deal with the
waiver problem in the narrow area of uninsured motorist protection
becomes more compelling. While it cannot be suggested that all auto-
mobile insurance waiver problems may be solved by reference to this
one issue, steps taken here might serve as guidelines for action in other
areas. Most courts, as reflected in Johnson, have taken the approach
that public policy mandates protection for the victim of the uninsured
motorist. However, judicial construction of public policy might be lim-
ited, as shown in Kohly and Pechtel and consequently, results are often
uncertain. It seems clear that if the legislative aim is one of public
protection, it is now up to the legislatures to make their policy clear and
either make uninsured motorist coverage strictly mandatory or limit the
"Research has revealed no reported cases dealing with these waivers.
1R. KEETON, supra note 43, § 6.3 at 357.
"'MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972).
"
7MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 340 (Supp. 1972).
5See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
19731
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waiver opportunities to narrowly defined groups, such as the current
Pennsylvania law. Only after such action can each member of the public
be assured of protection.
SANDRA R. JOHNSON
Securities Regulation- Glenn Turner: Closer to Economic Realities
A transaction comes within the purview of the federal securities
laws' only if it can be brought within one or more of the terms listed in
the statutory definition of a security! The traditional test enunciated by
the Supreme Court3 for one of these terms, the "investment contract,"
has been criticized by some state courts4 and by several commentators.5
Such criticism, however, was absent in the federal court opinions when
the Oregon federal district court, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. k§ 78a-z (1970).
-Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3 (a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(10) (1970). Section 77 (b)(1) reads:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferra-
ble share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a secu-
rity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," . . . .
Securities Act of 1933, § 2 (I), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970).
The delinition in the 1933 Act is "virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act."
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
If the transaction alleged to be a security does not fall within one of the specific categories
delineated in the definition, reference should be made to the more general classifications. SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
3SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
'See. e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). afrd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971); cf. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Silbergerg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
sSee. e.g., Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1970); Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security"': Is There a-More Meaning/id Formula, 18 W. Rus. L.
REV. 367 (1967). Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities /let
of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agree-
nent as a Security Under Securities Acts. Incuding lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311
(1969): Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971). Franchise Symposium: Franchising as a Security 33
OHIo ST. L.J. 718 (1972); Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257
(1973).
